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The Buddhist approach to testimony (āptavāda, āptāgama) as a valid means of 
cognition (pramāṇa) is far from univocal and involves an intricate and often also 
ambivalent attitude toward scriptural authority.  The paper focuses on several 
early Yogācāra Buddhist thinkers who accepted testimony as a reliable 
epistemic warrant, and offers an account of the sophisticated and highly 
reflective manner in which they approached the issue of scriptural meaning 
and authority. For this purpose, the paper first outlines the theoretical 
framework for considering scripture presented by the early Yogācāra 
philosopher Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti, focusing especially on his discussion of 
the criteria for canonicity and its implications for a system of hermeneutics 
based on the uncovering of authorial intent. The paper then examines in turn 
the way in which this framework and its internal tensions were worked out in 
the writings of Sthiramati (circa 6th century CE) and especially in his 
Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya-ṭīkā, focusing on his definition of “treatise” (śāstra) 
and his implied understanding of textual authority. 
 
 
The Buddhist approach to testimony (āptavāda, āptāgama) as a valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) is 
far from univocal – it varies across times, schools and sometime even within the thought of a single 
thinker1 – and involves an intricate and often also ambivalent attitude toward scriptural authority. 
Hence, for instance, we find on the one hand such Buddhist thinkers as the early Yogācāra 
philosophers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, whose acceptance of testimony as a pramāṇa went hand in 
glove with a rather wary approach to the authority of scripture, and on the other, thinkers like 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who, while rejecting testimony as a pramāṇa, still held scripture to have a 
certain epistemic purchase.2 
                                                             
 
1 For instance, in his Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asaṅga takes testimony (āptāgama) to be subservient to direct perception and 
inference, while in some sections of the Yogācārabhūmi corpus (the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and the section on the Hetuvidyā  in the 
śrutamāyībhūmi) also traditionally ascribed to him, he seems to presents it as independent of these two. See, respectively: 
Nathmal Tatia (1976: 253, section iih); Dutt (1978: 25, line 17-19); Wayman (1999: 23). 
2 While the epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti did not accept testimony as valid cognition (pramāṇa), it 
allowed for a type of inference that was based on scriptural sources, over and above the “ordinary” kind of inference (the 
latter defined as vastubalapravṛttānumāna, literally – an inference that functions by the force of [real] entities, i.e., an 
inference that is evaluated on the basis of facts and states of affairs). These two types of inference were differentiated by a 
division of epistemic labor according to which ordinary “objective inference” (to follow Tillemans’ phrase) deals with 
imperceptible (parokṣa) things, i.e., things that are inaccessible to direct perception but can be accessed through inference 
(for example, the “impermanence” of sound), while the latter kind of inference is limited to cases that involve extremely 
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In this essay I focus on several Yogācāra Buddhist thinkers who accepted testimony as a reliable 
epistemic warrant, and offer an account of the sophisticated and highly reflexive manner in which 
they approached the issue of scriptural meaning and authority. My aim is not to provide an 
exhaustive account of this vast and complicated topic but to highlight in broad strokes some of the 
basic presuppositions and tensions that underlie these thinkers’ conception of scriptural exegesis and 
authority. For this purpose I first outline the theoretical framework for considering scripture 
presented by the early Yogācāra philosopher Vasubandhu’s (est. 4th-5th century, CE) as laid out in his 
Principles of Proper Exegesis (Vyākhyāyukti, henceforth VY; Lee 2001). My focus in this first part is mostly 
on Vasubandhu’s analysis and discussion of the criteria for canonicity and its implications for a 
system of hermeneutics based on the uncovering of authorial intent.  
In the second part of the paper I turn to examine the way in which this framework and its 
internal tensions were worked out in the writings of Sthiramati (Circ. 6th century CE), a later Yogācāra 
thinker renowned mostly for his commentarial work on Asaṅga and Vasubandhu’s treatises. Here I 
focus on Sthiramati’s intriguing remarks on what constitutes a treatise (śāstra) and his implied 
understanding of textual authority, as presented in several key sections of his sub-commentary to 
Vasubandhu’s own commentary on Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes (MadhyāntaVibhāga-
bhāṣya-ṭīkā, MVBhṬ; Yamaguchi and Lévi 1934). 
 
1. Vasubandhu on the interpretation of scripture  
The locus classicus of Vasubandhu’s understanding of scriptural exegesis is his VY, a work that 
belongs to the uncommon genre of manuals for the proper interpretation of scripture and 
composition of commentary. The work is not just prescriptive, however, but also demonstrates the 
application of its lessons by interpreting some one hundred sutra passages assembled in an appendix 
to the work (the Vyākhyāyuktisūtrakaṇḍhaśata), and as such, it is at once a commentary on Mahāyāna 
scripture and a valuable source of knowledge on the way in which the Buddhist scholastic tradition 
conceived of its role, aims, and limitations.3 In the work, Vasubandhu states that one of the 
characteristics of a good commentary is its ability to respond to various objections regarding 
particular interpretations of scriptural passages, and then demonstrates how this should be done in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
inaccessible (atyantaparokṣa) objects, such as the detailed workings of karma, which are both beyond direct perception and 
syllogisms of the first kind. See Tillemans (1999: 27-30). 
3 Despite the works’ significance for both Indo and Tibetan Buddhist traditions (attested by its citation by various prominent 
commentaries), it has received relatively little scholarly attention to date, and has yet to be fully explored. For a survey of 
secondary literature on the work, see Tzohar (2013). 




section titled “Objections and Responses” (’gal len, *codyaparihāra). Here I would like to focus on a 
subsection in which Vasubandhu deals with “objections to meaning,”4 that is, cases in which 
Mahāyāna scriptural claims appear to be inconsistent or incompatible with other claims, primarily 
with what is normally regarded as authoritative speech (yid ches pa’i gsung, āptavāda), in this case, the 
canonical works of early Buddhism. 
Vasubandhu begins by attending to the phenomenon of interpretative difficulty posed by 
internal contradictions within a given Buddhist scriptural corpus – for example, the Buddha’s various 
and seemingly inconsistent claims about “truths.” This is settled by an appeal to a common Buddhist 
hermeneutical device, namely treating all the claims as true insofar as they express different implicit 
intents (abhiprāya) of the Buddha in different contexts (Nance 2012: 257-258). For our purpose it 
should be noted that according to this account, the meaning of scripture is not always self-evident 
but requires hermeneutical mediation to maintain consistency and coherency. Moreover, meaning is 
understood here in terms of the speakers’ (implicit) meaning, which can however be made explicit by 
an interpretative reconstruction. So, while scripture is capable of serving as an authoritative source 
for knowledge, this ability depends on its reliance on a ‘pre-textual’ authorial intent, which can be 
successfully reconstructed through interpretative efforts.  
The second kind of “objections to meaning” presented by Vasubandhu are cases in which 
scriptural statement stand in contradiction with reason (rigs, yukti), and by extension, with one of the 
three means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), namely perception, inference, and authoritative speech (yid 
ches pa’i gsung, āptavāda). Below I focus solely on the latter case, which Vasubandhu presents through 
the following objection placed in the mouth of a hypothetical Śrāvaka opponent, translated by 
Richard Nance:  
‘The Vaipulya group [of texts] is Mahāyāna’ is a statement that is in contradiction with 
scripture (lung, āgama). Some say that books of sūtra containing lengthy expositions are 
Vaipulya, but not Mahāyāna. Why? [Because] that [class of texts] is not the speech of a 
Buddha. Why is it not the speech of a Buddha? Because of contradiction — [i.e.] it 
contradicts what all groups acknowledge to be the speech of a Buddha (Nance 2012: 120). 
 
Here the opponent undermines the canonical status of the Mahāyāna scriptures because they 
are allegedly contradictory to what is already canonically accepted as the word of the Buddha and 
hence considered to be authoritative speech and a source for knowledge. The opponent then 
                                                             
 
4 This section was analyzed at length in Cabezón (1992), Nance (2004) and Nance (2012). The following analysis draws from 
both authors.   
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proceeds to point out various features of the Mahāyāna scriptures that undermine their authority 
and canonicity, for instance, their manifestation of internal contradictions, their incompatibility with 
fundamental Buddhist tenants, etc. (Cabezón 1992: 226-33; Verhagen 2005: 587-93). 
Vasubandhu’s line of defense is rather exceptional insofar as it does not seek to buttress this or 
other Mahāyāna claims but, rather, to undermine the opponent’s very conception of canonicity, and 
by extension to question the latter’s understanding of authoritative speech. In his reply, Vasubandhu 
points out that contradictions and inconsistencies are rife even in the sūtras of the early canon, 
which is itself incomplete (as some of the texts referred to there were not in existence already in 
Vasubandhu’s time) and inhomogeneous even among the Śrāvaka schools (hence its authority cannot 
be derived from its past acceptance by a certain school or lineage). In light of all of this, he argues, 
the opponent’s own criteria for scriptural authority render canonicity itself inadequate to serve as 
the standard for scriptural truth. As noted by Cabezon, Vasubandhu’s aim here is neither to refute the 
authenticity of the early Buddhist canon nor to undermine the epistemic role of testimony but only 
to demonstrate the practical impossibility of establishing the authenticity of any Buddhist text (the 
Mahāyāna sūtras included) solely on the basis of a clear-cut philological or historical criterion 
(Cabezón 1992: 228). Canonical indeterminacy and textual inconsistencies, he seems to suggest, are 
not themselves markers of textual inauthenticity, but are a call for the interpreter to step in and 
recover the implicit intent underlying the imperfect text, thereby restoring its connection to the 
authoritative words of the Buddha.   
While the hermeneutical framework described above is by no means exclusive to the Mahāyāna,5 
it does seem to assume an exceptionally significant role in this context. Seen as constituting a 
response of sorts to doubts regarding the Mahāyāna scriptural authenticity, this framework emerges 
as not merely a hermeneutical device but a constitutive feature of the Mahāyāna textual and 
commentarial identity. This very understanding seems to underlie, for instance, the hermeneutical 
agenda of such seminal texts as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, and is openly acknowledged by various 
other Yogācāra scriptural and commentarial passages. An example that epitomizes this approach is 
found in Sthiramati’s Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, where he states, with respect to the definition of 
                                                             
 
5 Ronald Davidson has argued that an earlier hermeneutical apologetics was applied by the Abhidharma — being the first 
new class of texts in Buddhist India that claimed the status of scripture, and laid the ground for the later Mahāyāna 
apologetics. See Davidson (1990: 303-06). 




Vaipulya, that those inclined to understand only the literal meaning (yathārutārthābhiniveśa) cannot 
“ride” the great vehicle, because the Mahāyāna doctrines are expressed only via implicit meaning.6  
It should be emphasized that this understanding of meaning as inherently layered was not 
merely a feature of the interpretations and commentaries on the Mahāyāna scripture, but traces back 
to the very nature of the Buddha’s word. This is manifested in the polysemic quality of the Buddha or 
a Bodhisattva’s speech, seen as capable of simultaneously teaching beings of diverse levels of 
understanding. Consider, for instance, the following paragraph from the Daśabhūmikasūtra, a text 
traditionally identified with the Yogācāra (and for which Vasubandhu is said to have written a 
commentary): 
If all the living beings, involved in the triple thousand great thousands world regions, 
approaching him, would ask questions in a moment and each of them would ask with the 
variety of immeasurable sounds and the second living being would not ask what the first 
one asks, a Bodhisattva will comprehend (all) the words and syllables of voices of all the 
living beings and after having comprehended he will completely satisfy the intentions of 
minds of all living beings by uttering one voice (Honda and Rahder 1968: 249). 
 
The polysemic quality of the Bodhisattva’s voice is clearly supposed to explain his ability to 
relieve the suffering of all beings, but it may also, against the backdrop of the Mahāyāna apologetics 
discussed above, stand to explain the apparent diversity of Buddhist teachings and constitute an 
argument of sorts for the Mahāyāna sūtra’s own authenticity (Davidson 1990: 309). 
While this passage seems to imply that a Bodhisattva’s authorial intentions are as multifarious 
as his interlocutors’ understandings of them (and that the hermeneutical recovery of these intentions 
is necessarily contextual and relational),7 it should not be understood as abandoning the possibility of 
interpretive closure. Indeed, while the Mahāyāna notion of meaning as inherently layered opens up a 
hermeneutical space in which the commentarial endeavor can materialize creatively and 
unapologetically, this hermeneutical openness is far from being all-permissive. The very idea of the 
Buddha’s teaching as revealing the true nature of reality requires meaning to be decisively and 
univocally determined, and to this end various Mahāyāna discourses establish a set of hermeneutical 
tools and criteria designed in theory to provide a definitive understanding and interpretation of the 
Buddha’s words (the most important of these tools being, of course, the distinction between 
                                                             
 
6 Tatia (1976: 112, lines 8-19). On the issue of non-literality in the Mahāyāna scriptures with respect to the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 
see Lamotte (1988: 15). 
7 Or alternatively, that interpretative closure is not to be found in the speech acts of the Buddha. See, for instance, Lugli 2010. 
Lugli points out an underlying dichotomy – common to various Mahāyāna sūtras – between the mere words (ruta) and the 
meaning (artha), and understands the latter to be inconceivable within the sheer realm of language. 
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interpretable and definitive meaning – neyārtha and nītārtha respectively – and their respective 
conditions, which apply to both discrete claims and entire texts; see Lopez 1988: 65-67 and Lamotte 
1988: 16-20).  
The main difficulty with these criteria for achieving interpretative objectivity and 
conclusiveness, however, is that in light of Vasubandhu’s critique described above, we must regard 
them as inevitably circular: definitive teachings are the mark of authoritative texts, and authoritative 
texts, in turn, determine which teachings may be considered definitive. Thus, despite the rhetoric of 
definitive meaning and authority, in praxis these criteria were often applied within Mahāyāna 
literature more through commentarial ingenuity than through rule following so as to confirm 
sectarian loyalties and pre-existing theoretical assumptions.8  
To recap: the hermeneutical framework described above presents a notion of scriptural 
authority marked by an internal tension – between the inherent openness and proliferation of 
meaning underlying the Mahāyāna view of scripture as the Buddha’s word, on the one hand, and its 
need for a clear-cut objective hermeneutical criteria for the determination of meaning, on the other; 
and between the rhetoric pronouncing such a definitive criteria and the inevitable circularity that in 
fact underlies its application.9 
 In the following section I turn to examine how and to what extent this hermeneutical 
framework, which has thus far appeared to be largely normative and prescriptive, along with its 
underlying tensions and inconsistencies, was worked out by the “normal science” of commentarial 
discourse. For this purpose I turn to Sthiramati’s sub-commentary on Vasubandhu’s commentary on 
the Madhyāntavibhāga, the former commentary being particularly fruitful for this kind of inquiry 
                                                             
 
8 See Lopez (1988: 52) and Lamotte (1988: 19). 
9 It is hard to determine the extent to which this tension was explicitly acknowledged by the Yogācāra thinkers, though it is 
unlikely that Vasubandhu could produce in the VY such a nuanced textual critique of early Buddhist canonicity without 
seeing its broader implications for his own criteria for establishing the status of the Mahāyāna texts – and in particular, the 
circularity of these criteria. An indication that Buddhist thinkers were indeed aware of this tension can perhaps be found in 
their professed and recurrent expressions of concern regarding scriptural misinterpretation, even at their own hands. 
Viewed in this light, Vasubandhu’s famous statement in the concluding section of his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is particularly 
telling:   
‘Is the catechism [Abhidharma. R.T] expounded in the present treatise the same as the one that the Teacher set forth? For 
the most part I have expounded the catechism established in the teachings of the Vaibhāṣika school of Kaśmir.... Whatever I 
have misunderstood here is my own fault. For only Buddhas and their direct disciples are authoritative in teaching the true 
religion. Now that our Teacher is dead, the eyes of the world are closed, and now that the majority of those who had 
firsthand experience [of the truths he taught] have met their ends, his teaching, which is being transmitted by those who 
have not seen reality and have not gained freedom [from their passions and misconceptions] and are inept at reasoning, has 
gotten all mixed up.... So, those who desire salvation, seeing that the Buddha's teaching is gasping its last breaths . . . must 
not become distracted. ’  (Hayes 1984: 654). 




because of its heightened hermeneutical self-awareness, a trait that no doubt reflects Sthiramati’s 
particular position within the Yogācāra’s textual development, as he is facing the task  of further 
synthesizing a vast corpus into a single coherent and consistent worldview that fits under the 
doxographical heading of Yogācāra.   
 
2. Sthiramati’s definition of Śāstra in the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya-ṭīkā   
In the introductory part of his sub-commentary, commenting on Vasubandhu’s salutary verses, 
Sthiramati provides an overview of the text’s transmission and accounts for its authoritative status. 
According to this account, the “author” or “promulgator” (praṇetṛ) of the text was Maitreya, said to 
be a Boddhisattva removed from complete Buddhahood by only one birth, who revealed the work in 
verse form10 to the expounder (vaktṛ) Asaṅga, who in turn made it available to Vasubandhu, who 
composed the commentary.11 According to Sthiramati, one of the aims of the salutary verses is to 
inspire general reverence for the text and buttress its authority: 
Reverence is generated towards the commentary because the meaning of the Sūtra is 
unerringly stated in it because these two [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. R.T], since they 
possess the highest wisdom, are able to understand, retain and explain [it], without 
erring. In this way, reverence arises towards both the Sūtra and the commentary on the 
part of those who rely on the authority of individual people. Also, on the part of those 
who rely on the Dharma, reverence arises towards both the author and the expounder 
because after the true meaning of Sūtra and the commentary has been understood, when 
a positive determination occurs, it is brought about through the understanding of the 
author and the expounder, but it is not accomplished through just speculation and 
scriptural tradition – thus reverence is generated towards the author and the expounder 
(Stanley 1988: 3).12 
                                                             
 
10 In the dedication, Vasubandhu refers to “the author of the treatise” (śāstra). Sthiramati’s commentary  clarifies that this 
means the kārikās  authored by the Bodhisattva Maitreya, and hence he consistently refers to the work not as a śāstra but as 
“the Madhyantāvibhāga sūtra.” See Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 2, line 4). The expounder he explains to be Asaṅga. 
11 Sthiramati seems to distinguish between two commentaries – the hypothetical vṛtti of the expounder Asaṅga, and the 
bhāṣya of Vasubandhu, which is the work before us. See Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 1, lines 11–12; 3, lines 1–2; and 2, lines 8–
9), respectively. Apart from these instances, Sthiramati makes no further use of this distinction, which was perhaps 
intended to indicate that the text delivered to Vasubandhu was already accompanied by Asaṅga’s elucidation. 
12 Here I follow Stanley’s suggested corrections (based on the Tibetan) to Yamaguchi’s edition. The passage thus reads as 
follows:  
tāv api uttamaprajñāvantau ‘bhrānti prativedhadhāraṇopadeśasāmarthyād atra sūtrārtham abhrāntam upadiśata iti  vṛttiyām 
gauravam utpadyate /evaṃ ye pudgalaprāmāṇikās  teṣāṃ sūtravṛttigauravotpattiḥ / ye ca dharmānusārinas teṣāṃ sūtravṛttyoḥ 
śubhārthe ‘vabodhaḥ / niścayaś ced utpadyate sa praṇetṛvaktrāvabodhād api prabhāvito bhavati na tu tarkāgamātreṇa prabhāvito 
bhavatīti praṇetṛvaktṛgauravotpattiḥ /   
See Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 3, ns. 6, 7). Unless otherwise indicated, all further translations of Ṭīkā passages are my own. 




Here the authority of the text seems quite evident, firmly established by the double criteria of 
the reliability of its source (attested by the level of accomplishment of the author and expounder) 
and the text’s compatibility with the doctrine (once the author’s and expounder’s intentions are 
properly understood). Sthiramati, however, goes on to further problematize this issue by 
complementing it with a rather intriguing definition of śāstra:13 
Now this should be discussed: what is the nature of a treatise (śāstra), and why is it 
[called] śāstra? A treatise consists of representations appearing as a collation of names, 
words, and syllables. Or alternately, a treatise consists of representations appearing as 
specific linguistic expressions that procure supramundane direct knowledge. But how 
can representations be articulated or expounded upon? There is no fault in here since 
the representations [obtained] by hearing follow from the representations of the author 
and expounder [Maitreya and Asaṅga].14 
 
 Sthiramati’s definition of śāstra (alongside an etymological definition drawn from Vasubandhu’s 
Vyākhyāyukti)15 is obviously made to fit the Yogācāra understanding that all phenomena – including 
all types of discourse – can be either known or discussed as mere mental representations (vijñapti). 
But this, says the opponent, poses a difficulty for its function as a discursive communicative activity. 
There are several ways of understanding what it is that Sthiramati sees as a possible difficulty.  
On one interpretation, the difficulty concerns, as in the case of the epistemological problem of 
the knowledge of other-minds, the epistemic access or lack thereof of a commentator to the mental 
representations of the expounder and author.16 An alternative interpretation, presented recently by 
Sonam Kachru, understands Sthiramati as referring here to the fundamental difficulty of attributing 
intention ascriptions – which are presupposed by any communicative discursive acts (and all the 
more so by commentarial activity) – to mere mental events (i.e., independently of any intentional 
agent; Kachru 2014). Drawing from Buddhist philosophy of action, Kachru suggests that Sthiramati’s 
solution to this difficulty is to point out that intentional content, much like public action, is not 
                                                             
 
13 As mentioned above (n. 19), the term śāstra stands in this context for the entire MAV corpus, including both revealed 
verses and commentary. 
14 idam idānīṃ vaktavyaṃ kīdṛśaṃ śāstrarūpam | śāstraṃ kiṃ ceti nāmapadavyañjanakāyaprabhāsā vijñaptayaḥ śāstram |atha vā 
lokottarajñānaprāpakaśabdaviśeṣaprabhāsā vijñaptayaḥ śāstram | kathaṃ vijñaptayaḥ praṇīyanta ucyante vā | 
praṇetṛvaktṛvijñaptiprabhavatvāt śravaṇavijṇaptīnāṃ nātra doṣaḥ|. The Sanskrit is from Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 2, lines 16-
20). I have accepted Stanley’s suggested correction of the Sanksrit, based on the Tibetan (D190a5), of śravaṇavijṇaptīnāṃ in 
place of prajñaptīnāṃ; see Stanley (1988: 3, n. 9). 
15 See TD. 4061 shi 123a, in Lee (2001: 227). 
16 See Kochumuttom (1982: 210: 212 n. 7). 




external to the perception of a communicative act but rather constitutes, phenomenologically speaking, 
its experience as such. In this respect, ascribing intention to a mental event would not be false 
because intentions are regarded as an intrinsic feature of the experience of the mental event as a 
discursive act. As regards our present concern, this interpretation carries important implications for 
the understanding of authorial intent. As noted by Kachru, while this shift into the phenomenological 
realm sustains the necessary alterity of the author’s intent (that is, it is different than the intent of 
the interpreter), confining intent to our experience also implies that it is inevitably mediated and 
accessible only via our interpretation.  
 While I find this argument largely convincing, it should be noted that its view of intent as 
necessarily mediated (and hence inevitably reconstructed) by interpretation arguably undermines 
the Buddhist hermeneutical approach described above and in which Sthiramati partakes. This is 
because treating intention ascription as an intrinsic feature of our experience would appear to be 
incompatible with treating the conclusive determination of authorial intent as a criterion for correct 
interpretation, and thus as extrinsic to interpretation. This incompatibility can be reconciled, it seems 
to me, by considering that Sthiramati is referring in this context not just to any discursive acts but to 
those prompted by the exceptionally accomplished personas, namely the author, expounder and 
“listener” (Vasubandhu).17 So that whereas under the framework of mere mental representations 
intentions become themselves a matter of mental representations (insofar as they are necessarily 
mediated by interpretation), it is these accomplished personas’ utmost wisdom, Sthiramati seems to 
tell us, that guarantees that the intention interpreted is indeed the one intended. It is therefore the 
textual authority that stems from possessing true knowledge of reality that rescues interpretation 
from becoming mere self-interpretation.18  
Finally, there is yet another way to understand the difficulty that arises from Sthiramati’s 
account of śāstra. According to Sthiramati’s definition – and it should be noted that this is his own 
emphasis, and not Vasubandhu’s – śāstra, insofar as it is carried by a line of second order mental 
representations, is fully immersed in the conventional realm. As such, he tells us, śāstra can be 
understood to operate in two distinct ways. First, it can be understood simply in terms of its 
assembled linguistic parts and their meanings, like any other communicative act. In addition to this, 
however, and unlike ordinary communicative acts, the discursive elements of śāstra can be 
                                                             
 
17 Most telling in this respect is Sthiramati’s omission of his own commentarial project from this tally. 
18 This framework seems to be on par with Sthiramati’s additional gloss of śāstra as an edifying discourse, which is evidently 
intended for Buddhist “insiders.” See Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 2, line 20; 3, line 2). 
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understood as efficacious in procuring supramundane gnosis, implying that the genre has a 
performative and transformative function over and above its informative role.19  
The main difficulty that arises from such a view is that defining discourse as mere mental 
representations of mental representations can imply a kind of mentalism, and as such, threatens to 
deprive discourse of any extra-discursive referential foundation.20 An explanation is therefore 
required as to: 1) how discourse can maintain its meaningfulness  – how it can “be articulated or 
expounded upon,” in the words of the objection above– and 2) how, if discourse is self-referential, it 
can still maintain its pretense to “reach” reality so as to be able to procure true knowledge. Seen in 
this light, Sthiramati’s discussion of the nature of śāstra seems to go beyond mere local textual 
concerns to question the meaningfulness and efficacy of the full range of the Yogācāra discourse.   
A possible solution to this difficulty may be found in other sections of Sthiramati’s sub-
commentary – most notably the third, “Reality” chapter (tattvaparicchedaḥ)21 – which propose a 
general understniang of how reference and ordinary discourse map onto the Yogācāra three natures 
scheme (trisvabhāva). As we will see shortly, this understanding allows Sthiramati both to ground 
discourse in causal mental descriptions, enabling him to avoid the traps of mentalism, and to view 
śāstra as a vehicle for transformative knowledge.  
As a preface to my exploration of this account of the referential process, a brief exposition of the 
three nature scheme is in order. Stated in the most general terms, this important Yogācāra tenant 
provides an account of reality as an interplay between three different aspects or points of view – the 
deluded way in which we ordinarily conceive phenomena (the imagined nature), its interdependent 
causal foundation (the dependent nature), and the true understanding of the ultimate state (the 
perfected nature). The presentation of this scheme varies across Yogācāra texts, perhaps reflecting a 
gradual development of this doctrine, and the question of its proper interpretation and the nature of 
the relations among the three natures is a matter of contention among scholars, both ancient and 
modern. One useful way of approaching this broad and complex issue is through Alan Sponberg’s 
distinction between a “pivotal model” and a “progressive model” of the three natures scheme 
(Sponberg 1982).  
                                                             
 
19 Here too Sthiramati seems to follow Vasubandhu’s VY, where the Buddha’s speech is described as the ultimate śāstra. See 
text quoted in fn. 15. 
20 Insofar as mentalism treats meaning as a function of the speaker's mental content. 
21  In particular the subsections on the “subtle and gross reality” (audārikasūkṣmatattvam) and the “skillful reality” 
(kauśalyatattvaṃ), the relevant sections roughly commenting on MAV verses 16 c-d and 10 b-c respectively. Sthiramati’s 
comments are invariably consistent and coherent, but their presentation is not ordered or linear. In what follows I will try 
to reconstruct their overall argument. 




In brief, the pivotal model takes both the imagined and the perfected nature to be aspects or 
modes of the dependent nature. The imagined nature is regarded as the deluded way in which we 
ordinarily conceive phenomena (in terms of a dualist distinction between subject and object and 
through conceptual differentiations), and the dependent is understood as the ontological 
interdependent causal reality underlying the imagined. In other words, while the imagined is the  
mistaken way in which reality appears to us, the dependent stands for the real causal nexus that 
brings about these false appearances. The perfected is understood within this framework as simply 
the absence of the imagined from the dependent – i.e., the dependent as seen once our 
misconceptions of it have been understood and removed.22  
The progressive model, by contrast, takes each of the three natures to represent stages of 
understanding, progressively higher, of the true nature of reality. Within this framework, one first 
conceives phenomena, mistakenly, as dualist appearances (the imagined), then understands them in 
causal and mental terms (the dependent), and eventually transcends this understanding (which is 
still pervaded by dualistic distinctions) in favor of a true vision of ineffable reality.  
With respect to the MAV, Mario D’Amato has argued that while the pivotal model appears to be 
the more prevalent, there seems to be at least one instance that conforms to the progressive model, 
suggesting perhaps that these are not after all incompatible perspectives.23 For present purposes, 
however, suffice it to point out the common features in the theoretical work performed by the two 
models of the three natures scheme: both enable the Yogācāra to supplement the two-truths 
distinction with a more dynamic model of reality understood in terms of a shift between three 
epistemic points of view, and this dynamic model, in turn, can readily accommodate the school’s 
causal description of the workings of the mind and its role in the construction of phenomena.   
Bearing this in mind, let us now return to Sthiramati’s explanation of the workings of language 
and reference through their mapping onto the three natures scheme. According to Sthiramati, the 
realm of the imagined can be correlated to a realist and essentialist understanding of meaning in 
                                                             
 
22 Still largely within the framework of the pivotal model, one can further distinguish between roughly two common 
interpretative strands that are tightly connected to the question of the nature of the Yogācāra Idealism – an approach that 
sees the three natures doctrine as providing an ontological account of reality, and one that considers it a description of 
reality from three different epistemic points of view. A lucid discussion of these interpretative approaches and the 
philosophical role of the three natures scheme is provided in a recent polemic between Jay Garfield and Jonathan Gold held 
at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion. See Garfield and Gold (2011). 
23 ‘But perhaps the pivotal and progressive models may be seen as consistent with one another, each providing an 
interpretation of the three-nature theory in a different key: while the pivotal model interprets the three natures in an 
ontological epistemological key (mind in relation to world), the progressive model interprets the three natures in a 
semiotic-epistemological key (mind in relation to signs, language, concepts)’ (D’Amato 2012: 18). 
Roy Tzohar – Thoughts on the Early Indian Yogācāra Understanding of Āgama- Pramāṇa  
272 
 
which designations are ordinarily (and falsely) understood to refer to existent essences (Yamaguchi 
and Lévi 1934: 140, lines 5-14). The dependent correlates to the understanding of these referential 
processes in terms of the causal-mental activity that underlies them. The perfected, as the absence of 
the imagined from the dependent, is understood as the ultimate nonexistence of such designated 
essences. Sthiramati further notes that while the dependent serves as the causal support for the 
process of designating, this is not evident in ordinary discourse because words are erroneously 
understood as referring to essences that are superimposed (adhyāropita) on the causal nexus.24 So, 
according to Sthiramati, words are ordinarily understood to refer to (imagined) existent essential 
objects that as a matter of fact are superimposed on the dependent, the latter conceived of as the 
causal nexus that brings about the mental appearances of these objects (and their corresponding 
designations).25  
In another subsection of this chapter, the “subtle and gross reality” (audārikasūkṣmatattvam), 
Sthiramati further develops this theory of meaning to differentiate between three modes of 
conventional language use (which once again map onto the three natures scheme).26 According to 
Sthiramati, when a person uses a word to refer to what he considers to be real existent entities, this 
mode is termed “the conventional as designation” (prajñapti-saṃvṛttiḥ). Here designation is 
understood in terms of its bare denotative (abhidhā) function, subsumed within the category of the 
imagined. The second mode is the “conventional as comprehension” (pratipatti), which stands for the 
deep structure of linguistic use, namely attachment (abhiniveśa) to objects that are taken to be 
externally existent because of conceptual differentiation (vikalpa). This mode is seen as 
corresponding to the dependent nature.  The final mode, “the conventional as expression” or 
“proclamation” (udbhāvanā), is conventional language use with respect to true reality (dharmadhatū), 
despite the latter’s ultimate inexpressibility. This mode corresponds to the perfected. It should be 
emphasized that for Sthiramati, these three modes do not represent three different ways of talking 
                                                             
 
24 Which he elsewhere seems to refer to as consciousness. See  Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 139, lines 3-9). 
25 Sthiramati’s account of how reference and meaning work according to the Yogācāra (that is, along the three natures 
scheme) is then supplemented, and to some extent supported, by a devastating critique of a realist-essentialist theory of 
meaning. This consists in demonstrating that any attempt to understand linguistic meaning as the outcome of relations 
between the triad of designation, an object, and its essence, is logically untenable. To this end, Sthiramati embarks on a set 
of arguments that also consider other referential theories – such as the view that designations manifest or reveal the object 
– and which are a summarized synthesis of similar arguments from a variety of sources, including the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the 
Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. See  Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 140, line 10; 141, line 21). For a survey of 
similar arguments in the Yogācāra texts mentioned above, see Tzohar (forthcoming). 
26 The text section under discussion is Yamaguchi and Lévi (1934: 123, line 19; 125, line 3). 




but, rather, three ways of conceiving of the meaning of the same language use27 – the first merely in 
its denotative-semantic function, the second as indicating the various causal processes underlying it, 
and finally in terms of its soteriological efficacy, that is, its capacity to delineate its own limitations.  
This layering of the meaning of conventional discourse brings us back full circle to Sthiramati’s 
initial definition of śāstra and its attendant difficulties. Recall that these concerned, first, the 
meaningfulness of discourse, and second, its ability to procure true knowledge under a framework of 
mere mental representation (which threatens to undercut discourse form any extra-discursive 
referential basis). As a possible response to these difficulties, Sthiramati seems to tell us that 
conventional discourse, when properly understood, reveals itself to be inherently polyphonic, 
simultaneously speaking in different voices that embody different points of view on the same reality 
(and which correspond and are delimited by the three natures scheme). It is therefore śāstra’s 
embrace of this polyphony that renders it a vehicle for obtaining super-mundane knowledge: the 
polyphony reflexively facilitates a shift away from the understanding of discourse as reifying 
linguistic phenomena toward its understanding as a line of second-order representations understood 
in terms of their underlying causal and mental reality. In this respect, śāstra, while still conventional 
insofar as it reflexively points out the limits of ordinary expression and facilitates a gradual 
understanding of the true causal reality underlying language, is seen to be denotative of the 
ultimate.28 
Furthermore, this framework also enables Sthiramati to avoid the kind of mentalism that would 
readily attach itself to a view of discourse as second-order mental representations. This is because 
while there are no real external objects to serve as referents for words, meaning and reference are 
nonetheless grounded in the causal mental reality that produces them. So with respect to the first 
difficulty, while this account undermines a notion of meaning as a function of a realist 
correspondence theory of truth, it does not render all discourse meaningless. Rather, what we find 
here is an understanding of discourse that, by reflexively uncovering its very conditions of becoming, 
broadens its semantic range to include causal and mental descriptions.29  
                                                             
 
27 The way these three modes being analogous to the three natures scheme as three “modes” of viewing reality seems self-
evident. 
28 It should be emphasized that this does not mean merely that śāstra is capable of demonstrating the conventionality of all 
discourse and the limits of language (and hence of gesturing in the direction of an inexpressible absolute); it suggests that 
śāstra also facilitates the turning of one’s gaze upon the ontological and causal reality that lie at the root of conventional 
discourse, and in this case, of śāstric discourse itself. Śāstra  shows the ontological conditions that underlie discourse, 
including the ones underlying itself. 
29 Hence accounting for referential relations in terms of causal and mental descriptions rather than under a realist 
correspondence theory of truth. This link between causal ontology and the realm of language and meaning is found also in 





In the first part of this essay I outlined several features of Vasubandhu’s account of authoritative 
speech as grounded in a broader understanding of scriptural interpretation. I began with his critique 
of the attempt to establish canonicity and textual authority using philological or historical criteria, 
and his alternative proposal of a hermeneutical approach that identifies meaning with implicit 
authorial intent, excavated from the text by the application of hermeneutical criteria that ensure the 
definitive status of such meaning. I argued that this non-literalism and the attendant view of 
meaning as inherently layered becomes something of an interpretative strategy for the Mahāyāna 
and an important part of its textual identity, which is often in conflict with a no less important 
practical need for final and definitive interpretative closure. Thus, this scheme was shown to be 
marked by an unresolved tension between the inherent openness and proliferation of meaning 
underlying the Mahāyāna view of scripture, on the one hand, and the school’s need for clear-cut 
objective hermeneutical criteria for the determination of meaning (and the inevitable circularity that 
in fact underlies its application), on the other.  
In the second part I examined how the inherent tensions of this framework are worked out in 
Sthiramati’s MVBhṬ. Considered in light of the general interpretative framework described above, 
Sthiramati’s account of śāstra appeared to be engaged primarily with the problem of conclusively 
determining the meaning of a text under a “representation only” account, once both the agent and 
external objects are taken out of the equation. This is because the “representation only” view 
threatens to undermine the understanding of meaning as a function of either intention ascriptions or 
an extra-discursive referential ground, which is required for establishing the text’s authority and its 
efficacy in procuring knowledge, respectively. Sthiramati’s solution to this problem, I suggested, is 
multifaceted. First, he suggests that the correct determination of meaning is guaranteed by the 
exceptional expertise of the persona involved (which serves as an extra-textual criterion for its 
meaning, authority, and relatedness to reality). This appeal to extra-textual authority, however, is 
not at odds with the understanding of the text as inherently layered, a feature that in the hands of 
Sthiramati is identified with the polyphonic quality of śāstric discourse – its ability to speak in 
multiple “voices” simultaneously.  These ‘voices,’ it was demonstrated, are systematically and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
the unique theory of meaning explicated in Sthiramati’s bhāṣya to Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, in which the causal 
underpinnings of language are developed into something akin to a (non-realist) figurative causal theory of reference. See 
Tzohar (2017). 




hierarchically ordered in accordance to the degree to which they can embody and express the 
underlying causal and mental reality – degrees outlined by the three natures scheme. Moreover, this 
framework, insofar it serves to evaluate discourse in terms of its insight into its underlying mental 
and causal conditions, provides an additional hermeneutical criterion – and this time intra-textual –
for determining the meaning and truth of discourse. In this respect, the framework offered by 
Sthiramati was shown to strike a certain balance between the need for a decisive interpretative 
reduction, on the one hand, and the Mahāyānic conception of the layerdness of meaning on the 
other. By incorporating both strands into his understanding of the nature of śāstra, Sthiramati is 
therefore able to guarantee the kind of interpretative closure necessary for upholding the authority 
of scripture, while understanding the ingrained ambiguity of the text not as an obstruction of truth 
but as means toward a transformative end.30 
 
Abbreviations 
MV   Madhyāntavibhāga. [Maitreya-Asaṅga].   
MVBh   Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya. [Vasubandhu].   
MVBhṬ   MadhyāntaVibhāgaBhāṣyaṬīkā. [Sthiramati].    
Vy   Vyākhyāyukti (rnam par bshad pa'i rigs pa). [Vasubandhu].  
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